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Empiricism and Subjectivity, by Gilles Deleuze, trans, by Constantin V. 
Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Reviewed by 
Clarence Shole Johnson, Spelman College. 
This book expounds what its author, in the Preface to the English 
language translation, describes as Hume's "most essential and creative 
contribution" to the history of philosophy. This contribution consists in the 
following: (i) Hume's establishment or belief as the key epistemological 
concept—indeed, of his reduction of knowledge to belief; (ii) Hume's use of 
the principle of association of ideas as both a culture-based and a 
convention-derived practice. As a culture-based and convention-derived 
practice, the associative mechanism exists "for the sake of law, political 
economy, aesthetics, and so on." And (iii), Hume created the first great logic 
of relations, showing in it that "all relations . . . are external to their terms" 
(pp. ix-x). These issues are amplified in a total of six chapters and a 
conclusion, the titles of which are as follows: 'The Problem of Knowledge 
and the Problem of Ethics" (ch.l); "Cultural Worlds and General Rules" 
(ch.2); 'The Power of the Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge" (ch.3); "God 
and The World" (ch.4); "Empiricism and Subjectivity" (ch.5); "Principles of 
Human Nature" (ch.6); and a conclusion entitled "Purposiveness." 
A uniting theme of the book is the place and role of the imagination in 
Hume's philosophy. Because this theme underlies the issues Deleuze raises, 
Empiricism and Subjectivity may therefore be read as an extended discussion 
of how the imagination functions in Hume's philosophical system. It is 
Deleuze's treatment of this topic that will be the focus or this review. 
In Chapter One, "The Problem of Knowledge and the Problem of 
Ethics," Deleuze elaborates the role of the imagination in Hume's account of 
belief-formation. He tells us that Hume substitutes a psychology of the 
mind with a psychology of the mind's affections (p. 21). Deleuze's meaning 
is that Hume rejects the substantialist theory of mind proposed by Descartes 
and others, and advances the idea that mind is a collection of distinct and 
distinguishable perceptions united by the principles of association. Deleuze 
takes the claim further, saying that Hume "constantly affirms the identity 
between the mind, the imagination, and ideas" (p. 22). How then does the 
associative principle factor into the whole schemer 
The associative mechanism provides a rule by which atomistic 
perceptions are related to each other to constitute a system. In this sense, he 
says, the imagination (or the mind) becomes human nature. "Association... 
is a rule of the imagination and a manifestation of its free exercise. It guides 
the imagination, gives it uniformity, and also constrains it. In this sense, 
ideas are connected in the mind—not by the mind" (p. 24). And it is in 
virtue of this relation among the atomistic perceptions that a person, an 
empirical subject, can affirm more than s/he has evidence for, can have 
expectations about the future, can make judgements about others, etc. 
According to Deleuze, the fact of knowledge is, for Hume, transcendence. 'It 
is transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my judgement 
goes beyond the idea. In other words, lama subject. I say "Caesar is dead," 
the sun will rise tomorrow," "Rome exists"; I speak in general terms and I 
have beliefs, I establish relations—this is a fact and a practice' (p. 28, 
emphasis in text). 
The discussion is again taken up in Chapter Three, 'The Power of the 
Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge." There, Deleuze shows that the role of 
the imagination in Hume's philosophy extends to his discussion of ethics. In 
particular, Deleuze argues that Hume's theory of ethics is grounded in the 
passions in so far as the passions are influenced by the associative principles 
or rules of the imagination. Thus, corresponding to the rule-Following 
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behaviour of the ideas in the formation of beliefs is a similar rule-following 
behaviour of the passions in morals. Furthermore, he contends, there is a 
logical interdependency between die association of ideas and the association 
of Ate passions in Hume's system. As he puts it, "association links ideas in 
the imagination; the passions give a sense to these relations, and thus they 
provide the imagination with a tendency [or a disposition]" (p. 63). In 
arguing for this position, Deleuze thus upholds Hume's claim about the 
unity of the various Books of the Treatise, m particular, he supports Hume's 
claim that the discussion in Book Two corroborates that which he had 
advanced in Book One. 
In the context of explaining belief-formation and the affirmation of 
judgments in terms of both the mechanism of association and the notion of 
transcendence (of the subject), Deleuze provides an insight into the meaning 
of the concept of 'subjectivity'. "Empirical subjectivity is constituted in the 
mind under the influence of principles affecting it; the mind therefore does 
not have the characteristics of preexisting subject" (p. 29). Elsewhere, 
Deleuze says 'The subject [qua collection] is not a quality but rather the 
qualification of the collection of ideas" (p. 64). 
It would be a mistake to think that, on Deleuze's reading of Hume, 
subjectivity implies solipsism. As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the 
associative mechanism enables the subject to transcend her/his individual 
self and to seek and acquire beliefs about others, the external world and so 
on, all of which are a part of nature. One of the reasons for the failure of 
rationalism in securing beliefs about the external world—indeed, of its being 
fraught with uncertainties—is its inability to recognize association both as 
the fundamental principle through which nature operates and manifests 
itself, and as the mechanism through which the subject transcends itself. 
Deleuze's discussion of the place of the imagination in Hume's philosophy, 
and of the significance of the principle of association, shows, if anything, 
why an empirical philosophy of the kind Hume proposed overcomes those 
limitations. It is for this reason he asserts that "empiricism is a philosophy of 
the imagination and not a philosophy of the senses" (p. 110). 
The issues examined in this book are undoubtedly very important and 
the author does his best to show that. In particular, Deleuze's treatment of 
the importance of the imagination in Hume's philosophy, together with the 
value of the associative mechanism, is highly commendable. However, this 
is not a book for amateur Hume readers. The topics explored are intricately 
interwoven, so that the reader should be an adept Hume scholar in order to 
appreciate the movement (both forward and backward) of the discussion. 
This said, I must point out that a severe weakness of the book is its density, 
vagueness, stilted expressions, artificiality, pretentious language and 
sometimes absolutely empty expressions—features that seem to be 
increasingly characteristic of Continental writing and scholarship. The first 
indication of this permeating feature of the book is in the translator's 
introduction. What, for example, is the meaning of the following sentence? 
Acknowledged or not, the empiricist principle of 
difference, along with the theorem of the externality of 
relations which was derived from it, strengthened 
Deleuze's choice of minoritarian discourse and fedinto the 
problematic of paratactic serializations (p. 2). 
Or take another: 
Finally, whether marked or unmarked, the resources of 
Hume consolidated Deleuze's opposition to the petitio 
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The Concept of Logical Consequence, John Etchemendy. Harvard University 
Press, 1990. Reviewed by Patrick Rardin, Appalachian State University 
If you believe that you have a guarantee of validity when you use the 
first-order predicate calculus to deductively'prove the validity of an 
argument, then you should read this book. John Etchemendy questions the 
foundation of logic and model-theoretic semantics. Specifically, he argues 
that we need a new interpretation of the soundness and completeness 
theorems for first-order languages. Strictly speaking, the soundness and 
completeness theorems jointly establish that all and only the model-
theoretically valid arguments of a first-order language are provable within a 
tiven deductive system. The received interpretation, which Etchemendy elieves is in jeopardy, is that the theorems jointly assure us that all and only 
the genuinely valid arguments of a first-order language are provable within 
a given deductive system. A new interpretation is needed, according to 
Etchemendy, because he identifies a false assumption underlying the 
acceptability of the received interpretation. The false assumption is that the 
principii of all theories endowing the transcendental field 
with the very subjective (egological and personological) 
coordinates the constitution of which should rather be 
accounted for and explained (ibid.). 
Or yet still: 
Hypotactic subsumptions are replaced by paratactic 
conjunctions and arborite constructions give way to the 
strategy of the AND. Repetition—time and also habit as 
repetition—holds the paratactic series together, making 
possible their convergence and compossibility as well as 
their divergence and resonance. Difference and repetition 
displace the dialectical labor of the concept and thwart the 
mobilization of negation for the sake of allegedly superior 
synthesis (p. 8) 
What we have here is nothing short of an egregious abuse of language, for 
these are but highfalutin expressions, full or sound and rhetoric signifying 
little. Because I am not proficient in the French language, I cannot therefore 
judge whether the general obscurity of the text is a result of poor 
workmanship on the part of the translator, or on Deleuze's own inability to 
convey his own ideas effectively with clarity. But the reader needs to be 
warned that this is not an easy book to plod through. 
Other irritants in the book include a number of typos. For example, on 
p. 6. line 7 there is 'not' for nor; p. 90, twelve lines from the bottom: 'form' 
instead of from; and p. 91, third line from the bottom: 'certian' for certain. At 
least one other error is more severe, even unpardonable, because it results in 
a misrepresentation of Hume's text. This error occurs in a note referring to 
Hume's discussion of how the principles of association guide the 
imagination, and there the word "More" is substituted for the word "Were." 
(See p. 138, note 9.) The passage being quoted from the Treatise contains the 
sentence "Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd 
join them" (T.p. 10). Imagine replacing "Were" with "More"! The sentence 
becomes absolutely unintelligible. 
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Standard model-theoretic semantics captures the concepts of genuine logical 
truth and genuine logical consequence (validity). 
The bulk of Etchemendy's book is a development of his argument that 
standard model-theoretic semantics fails to capture the concept of genuine 
logical truth. (He explains how these results can be extended to the concept 
ofiogical consequence.) He identifies Tarski's set-theoretic semantics as the 
paradigm of standard model-theoretic semantics and then goes on to 
develop his argument by focusing on Tarski's semantics and various 
Time is devoted to clearing up confusions which Etchemendy believes 
have served to obscure the extensional evidence against the adequacy of 
model-theoretic semantics. But the main thrust of Etchemendy's argument is 
that the principle which underlies Tarski's model-theoretic conception of 
logical truth, the reduction principle, is false. The extensional evidence is 
construed as symptomatic or this failure. 
In a step toward clarity, Etchemendy introduces the notions of 
representational semantics and interpretational semantics. They are treated 
as different conceptions of model-theoretic semantics. 
On the representational conception, models depict possible 
configurations of the non-linguistic world, the world language is about. 
Under this conception, a sentence true on every model would be true in 
every possible world, a necessary truth. 
On the interpretational conception, models provide possible 
interpretations of certain expressions appearing in the language, those not 
included in the set F of fixed terms which are set aside as the "logical" terms 
of the language. A standard set of fixed terms for first-order languages is the 
set consisting of 'or', 'not', and 'something'. Under an interpretational 
approach, both the set of models and the set of model-theoretic logical truths 
are dependent on two factors: the selection of F and satisfaction domains for 
each semantic category of expression to be interpreted. 
Etchemendy argues successfully that Tarski's model-theoretic semantics 
is interpretational semantics, not representational semantics. But his main 
point is that the failure to notice this difference leads people mistakenly to 
believe that Tarski's model-theoretic treatment of genuine logical truth is 
correct and to ignore the extensional evidence to the contrary. In other 
words, by confusing Tarski's semantics with representational semantics 
some mink that Tarski's semantics has provided a guarantee that the set of 
model-theoretic logical truths will coincide with the set of necessary truths. 
To the contrary, Etchemendy constructs a number of fairly simple examples 
where Tarski's interpretational semantics and representational semantics do 
not have the same models and differ on the extension of logical truth. There 
is a sense in which Etchemendy cogently demonstrates that Tarski's 
semantics does not guarantee that the extension of model-theoretic logical 
truths coincides with the extension of necessary truths. 
Placing Tarski's semantics within the domain of interpretational 
semantics, Etchemendy then goes on to present his extensional evidence that 
Tarski's semantics does not provide a guarantee that its extentions of model-
theoretic logical truth will coincide with the set of genuine logical truths. I 
want to call your attention to two very important notions at work in 
Etchemendy's discussion. 
First, there is the relativized concept of genuine logical truth. Genuine 
logical truth is treated as a form of analytic truth and relativized to a 
selection of F. A genuine logical truth is taken to be analytic relative to F, 
i.e., true by virtue of the meanings of the expressions in F. (Hereafter, I will 
refer to this set of relativized genuine logical truths as "genuine (relativized) 
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logical truths." This way of speaking will be elliptical for "a genuine logical 
truth relativized via analyticity to the set F of fixed terms.") 
Next, there is the underlying principle of Tarski's interpretational 
semantics, the reduction principle. It is: 
If a universal generalization is true, then its instances are 
logically true. 
This principle determines the extension of Tarski's model-theoretic logical 
truths, ana it need not be true in the languages for which it fixes the 
extension. 
It is on the basis of the reduction principle and his notion of genuine 
(relativized) logical truth that Etchemendy goes on to lay out the extensional 
evidence against the adequacy of Tarski s model-theoretic semantics. The 
evidence is to show that there is no guarantee that Tarski's semantics gets 
the extension of logical truths right. Hut getting the extension right actually 
means being coextensive with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths. 
It is important to notice that Etchemendy's attack on the extensional 
adequacy of Tarski's model-theoretic semantics, his claim that Tarski's 
semantics does not "capture" the notion of genuine logical truth, is not that 
Tarski's semantics provides us with the wrong extension for the set of 
genuine (relativized) logical truths for first-order languages where the set F 
is the standard set of logical expressions ('not', 'or', 'something'). His attack is 
that it gets it right by accident; the semantics does not capture the concept 
because it does not guarantee that the extension is right.. 
This is a problem, according to Etchemendy. His reasoning is that if 
there is no guarantee that the completeness and soundness theorems are 
about genuine logical truths, they cannot be interpreted as rigorous results 
about genuine logical truths. And if this is correct, then the completeness 
and soundness theorems guarantee neither completeness nor soundness for 
first-order languages. 
Etchemendy's argument that Tarski's model-theoretic notional of logical 
truth gets its extension right by accident has two steps. First, Etchemendy 
argues that the general model-theoretic account of logical truth for arbitrary 
selections of F gets the extension wrong more often than it gets it right. But 
again, getting it wrong means that the extension of model-theoretic logical 
truth does not coincide with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths. 
For instance, if F includes every expression in the language, then every 
truth of the language will count as a model-theoretic logical truth. But 
certainly, not every truth of the language will be true by virtue of the 
meanings of the expressions in F. In this case, model-theoretic truth is said 
to overgenerate with respect to the genuine (relativized) logical truths. The 
alternative is to limit F to a proper subset of the expressions of the language. 
But even if we do, the problem of overgeneration remains, and so too, the 
problem of undergeneration. In the case of undergeneration there will be 
some genuine (relativized) logical truths which willnot be included among 
Tarski s model-theoretic logical truths. These will be true by virtue of the 
meanings of expressions left out of F. Etchemendy provides a number of 
good examples which demonstrate these points of extensional divergence. 
Next, Etchemendy addresses the case where Tarski's model-theoretic 
logical truth is coextensive with the set of genuine (relativized) logical 
truths. This is the case where F is our standard set of logical expressions. In 
this case, he argues that the extensional agreement is not guaranteed, but a 
matter of accident. The reason is that Tarski's semantics reduces the model-
theoretic logical truth of a sentence to the ordinary truth of a universal 
generalization of which the sentence is an instance. As a result, the 
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extension of model-theoretic logical truth can be influenced by facts which 
Etchemendy clearly demonstrates that when model-theoretic logical 
truth does coincide with the set of genuine (relativized) logical truths (in the 
case of the standard set F), it does so because of specific extralogical facts. 
These include "an assumption of an infinite number of objects, the assumed 
distinguishability of those objects, the existence of transitive, irreflexivie 
relations with and without minimal elements, and so forth" (p. 127). Our 
success is therefore not guaranteed, but contingent. 
The final blow to the adequacy of Tarskrs semantics is Etchemendy's 
argument mat the reduction principle is false. Once again, it states: 
If a universal generalization is true then all of its instances 
are logically true. 
Etchemendy's argument is straightforward. It is: "The reduction principle is 
false because the mere truth of a universal generalization cannot guarantee 
that its instances will be logical truths. 
Etchemendy explains that the failure to notice the falsity of the 
reduction principle is due in part to the extralogical facts about our set-
theoretic world; they take the slack and, in effect, gerrymander the right 
extension. Again, the problem is that these extralogical facts are contingent 
and therefore do not guarantee that the extension is right. 
Etchemendy also argues that any reasonable attempt to revise the 
reduction principle will fail. He considers how mentioning the set F might 
salvage the principle. There are two ways to do this. First, F may be treated 
as a variable, and Tarski's semantics may be treated as a completed analysis 
of a fundamentally relational notion. The other is to treat Tarski's semantics 
as an incomplete analysis of a fixed notion of logical truth, i.e., logically true 
for a fixed set F. Etchemendy explains why neither of these approaches are 
completely successful. 
If a universal generalized sentence is true, then all of its 
instances are logically true with respect to those 
expressions not bound by the initial universal quantifiers. 
This modification comes about because the set F determines which 
expressions can be replaced by variables and hence which expressions do 
not get bound by the quantifiers in the associated universal closure. Tarski's 
reduction principle now tells us that if the closure is true, then the instances 
are logically true with respect to that selection of John Etchemendy's and 
with respect to any selection that includes all the unbound expressions in the 
closure. 
However, Etchemendy demonstrates that even this modified version of 
the reduction principle fails to capture the genuine (relativized) logical truth. 
For the truth of a universal generalization does not guarantee that all of its 
instances will be true by virtue of the meanings of the expressions not bound 
by the universal quanitifers. The universal generalization might be true 
because of certain contingent facts about the objects in the satisfaction 
domains. 
The second approach is no help either. On the second approach, one 
would have to give some account of what makes one selection of F right and 
others wrong. But Etchemendy argues that this is not possible. For what 
makes Tarski s definition work is not that there is some relevant property for 
the selection of the expressions in F, but because of contingent features about 
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the world of set-theory, for instance, that the set-theoretic universe is infinite. 
These are contingent features of the world of the substitution domains. 
The conclusion of Etchemendy's attack on Tarski's model-theoretic 
semantics is that Tarski's semantics does not provide a guarantee of its 
extensional adequacy. With this failure, Etchemendy believes that without 
some rethinking of the matter we cannot interpret the' rigorous results of the 
completeness and soundness theorems as rigorous results for first-order 
languages. 
It is not until the end of the book that Etchemendy provides new, 
indeed leaner, interpretations of the completeness and soundness theorems. 
What is new is that the guarantee of completeness and soundness extends 
not just to the extension of deductive validity (as the received interpretation 
would have it) but to the extension of Tarski's model-theoretic validity as 
well. But to make this extension, the guarantee of completeness and 
soundness is limited. According to Etchemendy, what we have left are the 
following metatheorems for first-order languages: 
(Ml) Model-theoretic validity (as well as deductive 
validity) is sound in that only intuitively valid 
arguments are model-theoretically valid. 
(M2) Model-theoretic validity (as well as deductive 
validity) is not complete in that there is no 
general way, short of making all the expressions 
of the language logical expressions, to guarantee 
that the model willcapture them all. 
(M3) Model-theoretic validity (as well deductive 
validity) is complete relative to a collection of 
algebraic structures characterized by first-order 
axioms in that "the consequence relation 
simultaneously captured by the model theory 
and proof theory coincide with the specialized 
notion of consequence used by the algebraist 
when reasoning about a range of structures" (p. 
I strongly recommend this book to anyone who has a philosophical 
interest in model theory, even those who lack a forte for the formal details of 
proof theory. Etchemendy's book is well written, and the reader can easily 
follow the reasoning about the form notions without getting bogged down 
with tedious formulas and definitions. At the same time, I do nave some 
philosophical reservations about the rigor of Etchemendy's project. 
Etchemendy's goal is not simply to attack Tarski's model-theoretic 
semantics. He also wants to interpret the completeness and soundness 
theorems as providing rigorous results about genuine logical truths and 
logical consequences of first-order languages. All of this he attempts to do 
with the help of some auxiliary notions which are in some cases to link 
Tarski's model-theoretic semantics to genuine logical truth. These auxiliary 
notions are representational semantics, genuine (relativized) logical truth, 
i.e., analytic with respect to a set F of "logical" terms, and common logical 
truths. However, the relationship between the genuine logical truths, on the 
one hand, and the extensions of Etchemendy's quasi-formal notions of 
representational semantics, genuine (relativized) logical truth, and common 
logical truths is no better offepistemologically than is the direct relationship 
between the extension of Tarski's model-theoretic logical truths and the 
extension of the genuine logical truths. There are three places where this is 
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evident, and in each case I find an obscure philosophical notion vitiating 
rigor. 
First, there is the argument that Tarski's model-theoretic semantics is 
not representational semantics. This Etchemendy does establish. But what 
impact does this have on the relationship between Tarski's model-theoretic 
logical truth and genuine logical truth? Since Etchemendy is unclear about 
the relationship between representational semantics and genuine logical 
truth, the answer has to be that we don't know for sure. 
Etchemendy tells us that representational semantics does not give an 
adequate analysis of the notion of genuine logical truth, but he does 
"identify" genuine logical truth with necessary truth (p. 25). This 
identification is as obscure as is the notion of necessity, and although 
Etchemendy admits the obscurity of his notion of necessity, he fails to realize 
that this obscurity vitiates his claim that he has proven anything rigorous 
about the relationship between Tarski's semantics and ordinary logical truth. 
All that Etchemendy rigorously establishes is that the set of Tarski's model-
theoretic logical truths does not coincide with the set of necessary truths as 
defined within a representational interpretation of model-theoretic 
semantics. 
Next, the extensional evidence which Etchemendy musters against 
Tarski's semantics is to show that Tarski's semantics gets the extension of 
genuine logical truth wrong for most selections of F and right only by 
accident. But the evidence is actually not in terms of genuine logical truth; it 
is in terms of the notion of genuine (relativized) logical truth, true by virtue 
of the meanings of the expressions in F. 
Again, genuine logical truth is associated with an obscure philosophical 
notion, this time, analyticity; a genuine logical truth is associated with being 
analytic with respect to F. In Etchemendy^ terms, "we can view logical truth 
as so relativized (p. 106). Is "viewing" a semantic notion? But again, the 
lack of rigor surrounding the notion of analyticity stands in the way of what 
Etchemendy's rigorous argument has to say about the relationship between 
Tarski's semantics and ordinary logical truth. Is there a definite set of 
analytic truths? What sort of guarantee's do we get from "a view" of logical 
truth? 
Finally, there is a failure of rigor in what I have characterized as 
Etchemendy's third metatheorem, (M3). (M3) is our best hope in view of 
(M2). (M2) tells us that model theoretic truth is not complete, and (M3) is a 
statement of limited completeness. But when proving (M3), Etchemendy 
employs what he calls a trick. "The trick is to shift attention from the logical 
properties of any particular language to the logical properties common to a 
range of languages" (p. 151). 
The problem with mis trick is that the notion of common logical truth is 
not built on the notion of genuine logical truth, rather it is built on the notion 
of genuine (relativized) logical truth, analytic with respect to a set F of fixed 
terms. So, this notion of common logical truth can hardly pass as our notion 
of genuine logical truth anymore man the notion of genuine (relativized) 
logical truth can sopass. 
Accordingly, Etchemendy is not clear about how mis notion of common 
logical truth can be identified with what he refers to as "the specialized 
notion of consequence used by the algebraist when reasoning about a range 
of structures is related to the concept of genuine logical truth." Is the 
genuine logical truth the one used by the human when reasoning about 
anything at all? 
What is clear is that Etchemendy believes that genuine logical truth is 
somehow tied up with necessity, analyticity, and a pnoricity, even if he does 
not rigorously explain how. Me does argue that Tarski mistakenly believed 
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Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition," by Charles Taylor. 
Princeton University Press, 1992. Reviewed by David A. Reidy, University 
of Kansas. 
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" constitutes the 
Inaugural volume of the Princeton University Center for Human Values. 
The volume centers on Charles Taylor's essay, "The Politics of Recognition," 
which is followed by responsive essays by Susan Wolf, Steven Rockefeller 
and Michael Walzer. Amy Gutmann, the director of the Princeton Center, 
introduces the volume. 
As Gutmann's helpful introductory essay notes, the volume "focuses on 
the challenge of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition as it faces 
democratic societies today, particularly the United States and Canada...." 
Gutmann identifies the challenge in the following question: "Is a democracy 
letting citizens down, excluding or discriminating against us in some 
morally troubling way, when major institutions fail to take account of our 
particular identities?" While the problem is not an exclusively Hegelian one, 
the general tenor of Taylor's solution is. 
Taylor begins his featured essay with the noncontroversial claim that 
"our identity [as individuals] is partly shaped by recognition, or its absence, 
often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can 
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them 
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves." But, Taylor notes, while this claim appears noncontroversial 
today, it would not have so appeared two or three centuries ago. 
Two historical facts have ushered in the contemporary concern with 
identity and recognition. First is the collapse of those social hierarchies 
that his own semantics captured an essential necessity of genuine logical 
truths. Etchemendy even dubs the reasoning äs 'Tarski's fallacy" (pp. 85-94). 
But with the philosophical difficulties facing the latter notions ana the fact 
that Etchemendy does not address any of them, I find his argument for the 
existence of significant intentional differences between Tarski's model-
theoretic extension of logical truth and the set of genuine logical truths 
lacking the sort of rigor required to force a recall on the received 
interpretation of the completeness and soundness theorems for first-order 
languages. 
But don't take my word for it; read the book and judge for yourself. If 
Etchemendy is correct, the foundation of logic and model-theoretic 
semantics is fractured. I will close with Etchemendy's summary of the 
situation: 
Identifying logical consequence with model-theoretic 
consequence is as mistaken as identifying it with 
derivability. The question of whether one sentence 
follows logically from another does not come down to 
whether there are interpretations that make the latter one 
true and the former false; logically valid arguments can 
fail this test, while invalid arguments can slip by it. 
Through the model-theoretic account may sometimes get 
the extension exactly right, as may deductive 
characterizations, this is not because either of them 
captures, or comes close to capturing, the genuine concept 
(p. 157). 
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which underwrote a system of honor, a system which distributed 
recognition in zero sum fashion—one's status as a lord depended upon the 
status of others as servants. Today we think in terms of the universal 
dignity of all persons, we distribute recognition equally, at least formally. 
The second historical fact underwriting the contemporary concern with 
identity and recognition is the emphasis upon the individual as the source of 
her authentic identity—the notion that each must find for herself her unique 
way of being. Historically, the ideal of authenticity has been understood 
monologicatly. That is, the individual finds her true self internally. 
However, in recent years philosophers and social psychologists have come 
to see that identity is produced dialogically. Thus, the modern age 
represents less the emergence of a need for recognition man the appearance 
of the conditions under which an attempt to secure recognition might fail. 
Where recognition is thought formally to be distributed equally and identity 
is understood to be an internal rather than social affair, the recognition needs 
of some, typically minorities and women, may not be met. 
Taylor notes the tension between these two historical developments. 
The first ushers in a reign of formal equality and the idea of universal 
human rights. The second gives rise to a politics of difference and suggests 
that privileging universal notions of humanity, what is common to all, 
simply cannot sustain for every individual the dialogic realization of an 
authentic identity. Thus, in a democratic society marked by sexual, gender, 
cultural, racial and religious diversity, an inevitable contradiction arises: 
representatives of certain cultures (or gender, etc.) demand that the specific 
content of their identity, their cultural background, etc., be affirmed as of 
worth equal to that of the dominant culture (or gender, etc.) To put it 
differently, individuals demand to be recognized as equal, not formally, but 
in their concrete differences. They demand meaningful recognition. 
Taylor spends the lion's share of his essay analyzing this demand within 
the context of liberal democracies. I cannot review that analysis here. I can, 
however, preview Taylor's conclusion. Taylor concludes that 1) a liberal 
democracy must take seriously the recognition needs of all its citizens and 
that 2) in a culturally diverse liberal democracy this requires approaching 
minority cultures and forms of life with a "rebuttable presumption that they 
have something to offer, that they are of value and deserve recognition. 
Importantly, Taylor concludes that the idea that all cultures are, a priori, of 
equal value undermines the possibility of conferring the very recognition 
members of minority cultures desire: they desire respect, not condescending 
acknowledgement. Finally, Taylor draws upon Gadamer to suggest that in 
studying minority cultures members of the dominant culture wilTexperience 
a transformation of their terms of evaluation, thus opening up the possibility 
for a recognition of minority cultures in their difference, a recognition 
beyond the unsatisfactory "they have value because they are like me." 
Wolf, in her responsive essay, takes Taylor to task for two alleged 
failures. First, she highlights the need to distinguish between the claims of 
cultural, racial and ethnic minorities, whose particular identity is not 
recognized, and women, whose particular identity is all too recognized, 
indeed is relied upon to discriminate (e.g., women are frail, emotional and 
less rational than we" are). If equality in difference constitutes a political 
ideal Taylor and Wolf share, Wolf notes that whereas cultural, racial and 
ethnic minorities place slightly more emphasis upon obtaining recognition 
of their "difference," women continue to place slightly more emphasis upon 
obtaining recognition of their "equality." Here Wolf correctly notes that 
feminism in the United States and Canada remains, for largely historical 
reasons, more humanistic than gynocentric, although gynocentnc feminism 
has gained ground in recent years. (Humanistic feminism tends to evaluate 
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women's moral, social and political status against criteria taken to be 
appropriately gender-neutral or humanist, criteria applicable to men and 
women. Gynocentric feminism tends to dismiss the possibility of any such 
criteria and instead seeks in women's experience a normative benchmark 
against which to judge women's, and in some accounts men's, moral, social 
and political status.) In any case, Wolf fails to note that like women many 
members of minority racial, ethnic and cultural groups too feel that they are 
identified with their differences as seen from the perspective of the 
dominant culture (e.g., their food, literature and music is primitive and 
tribalistic and they are therefore unlike "us"). This identification, of course, 
motivated several decades of (and continues to motivate) equality-oriented 
(humanistic rather than, say, afro-centric) struggles for emancipation in the 
United States. Wolfs essay would benefit from a more careful discussion of 
the relationships between humanistic and, for example, gyno- or afro-centric 
"Second, Wolfnotes that one need not sort out, as Taylor attempts to do, 
the difficult issues regarding the value of particular cultures and ways of life 
to advance the multiculturalist agenda. She notes that in a diverse liberal 
democracy such as the United States, simply asking "Who are we?" and 
"What is our history?" will require an opening of the canon and a 
broadening of curriculum. For surely "we are not all white males of 
European descent. Wolf assumes that if "we" are truly diverse individuals, 
then those diverse individuals will achieve a healthy identity within the "we" 
to which they belong. The problem here is that once one has acknowledged 
that "we" are black, gay, asian, native american, female, Jewish, etc., one feels 
compelled to undertake a normative evaluation of "our' diversity. And this 
raises the very problem Taylor seeks to address: the evaluation of our 
diversity. 
Rockefeller, who subscribes to John Dewey's substantive conception of 
liberalism, worries that identifying the public identity of particular 
individuals with their cultural group will inevitably undermine liberalism. 
Liberalism for Rockefeller is a form of the good life, one in which a 
democratic articulation of value is taken to be the highest good. Thus, 
setting aside any set of cultural commitments as somehow deserving respect 
regardless of their survival in a sort of marketplace of ideas constitutes a 
threat to the liberal democratic way of life. While Taylor attempts to back 
away from this consequence of his position through the notion of a 
"rebuttable presumption" of value, Rockefeller argues that he does not 
completely escape it. 
Walzer, who confesses complete agreement with Taylor, devotes his 
energy to clarification rather than criticism. He contends that state neutrality 
vis a vis conceptions of the good life does not necessarily follow from liberal 
commitments, but may follow. That is, members of a liberal society may 
choose to endorse state neutrality, and this will be particularly appropriate 
for those societies whose members are primarily immigrants like the United 
States and Canada. On the other hand, members of a homogenous society of 
indigenous peoples, for example, Norway, need not commit to state 
neutrality but may instead foster particular forms of the good life, provided 
they do not run afoul of the basic rights of any citizens in the process. 
Unfortunately, Walzer does not establish the relationship between state 
neutrality, which is often understood as a principle of constraint, and the 
politics of multiculturalism Taylor envisions. For surely, if Taylor is correct, 
a liberal state may act so as to ensure minority cultures enjoy a rebuttable 
presumption of value and receive a fair evaluation within civil society. 
Whether such state action runs afoul of our best conceptions of state 
neutrality is not clear. 
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In sum, this short book is well worth reading for those whose interests 
include contemporary liberal theory and the sool led "politics of difference," 
the oft-discussed "right" to cultural identity/survival, affirmative action 
issues, and the fate of liberal education. Tobe sure, the book's length and 
format preclude a sustained, treatise-like analysis of any of these issues. 
Nonetheless, the work should prove thought-provoking to the interested 
reader. And while the authors only infrequently make the connections to 
Hegel implied by the book's title, those connections are there for the 
pondering. I recommend the work for those who wish to think carefully 
about the possibilities liberal democracy presents for those of us in the 
United States and Canada to move beyond a lingering master/slave 
consciousness and realize in a meaningful way the equal dignity, worth and 
freedom of all. 
